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Farmers as Producers of Clean Water:   
Getting Incentive Payments Right and Inducing Farmer Participation 
 
Abstract 
This research involved a field experiment using watershed payments as an incentive for 
farmers to address agricultural non-point pollution (ANP).  Objectives were to:  (1) 
describe how payments were estimated for a field experiment; (2) explain why a team 
approach is needed for ANP; (3) discuss the essential elements used for recruitment of 
farmers into a field experiment setting; and (4) address whether or not farmers were 
motivated to participate and pursue ANP abatement.  One year into the experiment, the 
results are encouraging.  About one-half of farmers who attended meetings are 
participating.  They own or operate approximately 41% of the agricultural land in the 
watershed.  Farmer actions to date have included determining an allocation formula for 
the payment, requesting watershed wide sampling, and cost sharing of ANP abatement. 
 
Key words:  field experiment, team approach, agricultural non-point pollution, 
performance-based incentives 
 
The current approach to addressing agricultural non-point pollution (ANP) has 
focused on voluntary conservation measures that are implemented by farmers with cost-
share assistance and technical support from the government (Ribaudo et al.).  These 
conservation measures are generally directed by federal agencies and require farmers to 
conform to strict behavioral guidelines to receive the assistance.  In addition, State 
governments are moving towards increased regulatory control of agricultural operations.  
For example, the state of Maryland, under the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1998, 
now requires all farms to have a nutrient management plan.  In either case, farmer input 
into water quality improvement strategies is limited. 
As total maximum daily load planning and implementation clearly demonstrate, 
water quality represents a watershed-wide problem that cannot be solved one farmer at a 
time.  Rather, a coordinated action at a watershed level is preferred.  In order to induce a 
coordinated, team approach to ANP control among farmers, economic or regulatory   3
incentives are required.  Segerson, Horan et al., and Segerson and Wu describe ambient-
based tax and subsidy approaches.  Performance-based payments at the watershed level 
are another example of economic incentives that can be provided to farmers.  These 
payments provide an opportunity to change farmer perspectives of water quality 
conservation from an operational constraint to an income generating opportunity.  In 
order to be effective, however, watershed-level payments need to induce interaction and 
decision-making among farmers within the watershed (i.e. a team approach).      
  The literature on team approaches to water quality improvement has examined 
theoretical and laboratory experiment aspects (see Spraggon; Romstad; Poe et al.; Taylor 
et al.; Millock and Salanie; and Vossler et al.).  In contrast, the research discussed in this 
paper involves a field experiment using actual farmers and real monetary payments.  
Therefore, there are real consequences for farmers from participation.  Thus, the 
participant recruitment aspect of this paper covers an unexplored area in previous 
research on water quality economics.   
The study site for this field experiment is Cullers Run watershed.  This stream is a 
tributary of the Lost River in the eastern panhandle region of West Virginia.  It occupies 
2,978 hilly hectares in Hardy County, West Virginia’s largest poultry production county 
(USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service).  Sixteen percent of the watershed is 
devoted to agriculture, mostly pasture or hay land.  Row crops comprise 3.63% of the 
agricultural land, primarily in the floodplain (Cacapon Institute).  The rest of the 
watershed is forest.  There are approximately twelve poultry houses conducting intensive 
poultry production in the watershed. Most agricultural fertilizer use in the watershed is 
provided by poultry litter.    4
  The Cullers Run watershed has the advantage of being small enough to limit the 
number of farmer households that could participate in the project.  Small group size 
reduces the information burden on farmers (Ribaudo et al.). In addition, this watershed 
was included in a federally-funded research project that generated water quality data prior 
to the experiment (Cacapon Institute).  
The objectives of this paper are to:  (1) describe how payments were estimated for 
the field experiment; (2) explain why a team approach is needed for ANP; (3) discuss the 
essential elements used for recruitment of farmers into a field experiment setting; and (4) 
address whether or not farmers were motivated to participate and pursue ANP abatement.  
The next section applies the theory of teams to this field experiment.  We then examine 
how prices and water payments were estimated prior to the field experiment.  After 
summarizing and comparing simulated with actual payments, we discuss the methods 
used to encourage farmer participation.  This paper finishes with sections on farmer 
participation and conclusions.   
Theory of Teams 
Figure 1 provides a schematic description of traditional technical assistance and 
cost share programs provided by the government for ANP.  Acting as a principal, the 
government provides information and cost share opportunities to farmers and treats 
farmers as autonomous units with regard to their impacts on water quality.  Farmers, 
acting as individual decision making units, decide whether or not to undertake water 
quality protection actions.  Only a portion of farmers (C and F in Figure 1) decide to 
undertake these actions.  These actions lead to water quality outcomes which do not 
directly relate back to the recipient of government cost share and technical assistance.     5
Figure 1 ABOUT HERE 
There are motivations, however, for both the principal and for farmers to engage 
in a team approach.  From the perspective of the principal acting for society as a whole, 
these include: (1) non-point pollution is difficult and costly to identify from individual 
sources so it is more feasible from an informational perspective to measure pollution at a 
watershed basis; (2) farmers potentially have information about their own and/or their 
neighbors’ pollution contributions that regulators would have difficulty obtaining; (3) a 
potential for dealing with fewer entities; and (4) teams allow for farmers to influence the 
water quality protection behavior of other farmers, for example, through the use of moral 
suasion. From a farmer perspective, watershed level decision-making is a reasonable 
approach to problem solve if farmers perceive a water quality problem from ANP 
pollution or want to take advantage of water payments.  In addition, Romstad describes 
economic incentives for farmers to join a team approach under the threat of more costly 
individual regulation. 
The economic incentives provided for team participation can be either negative 
(threat of individual regulation or taxation) or positive (provide a subsidy to participate).  
Threats imply that society operates from a polluter pays principle and/or that citizens 
have a right to clean water.  Subsidies imply the property right to clean water lies with the 
agricultural landowner.  A combination of negative and positive incentives can be used, 
for example, when water quality standards are implemented with pollution in excess of 
the standard being taxed, and subsidies provided when pollution levels are below the 
standard (Segerson).  In our field experiment, we take a different approach.  Payments are   6
strictly positive, and increase with increasing water quality.  This conveys a low-risk 
negative incentive in the form of an opportunity cost to pollution. 
Figure 2 depicts the principal’s role under a team approach.  Here the principal 
interacts with farmers as a team, thereby recognizing that interconnections exist between 
farmers in how they may impact water quality.  The team decides which actions to take 
regarding water quality and then the water quality outcomes can influence team decisions 
(for example via watershed wide sampling and determination of sub-watershed pollutant 
loading) and payment levels.  
 Figure 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
As shown in Figure 2, farmers can be connected in terms of their water quality 
protection actions as Farmer C impacts Farmer B and D’s water quality protection 
actions.  The farmer interactions presented in Figure 2 occur in the Cullers Run 
watershed in terms of poultry litter used for fertilizer.  In this example, assume Farmer C 
is a poultry grower without a sufficient land base to utilize the nutrients in poultry litter.  
To dispose of litter, Farmer C transfers litter to Farmers B and D (with or without cash 
compensation) to apply on their agricultural land.  In this case, team decision making at a 
watershed level has the potential to improve water quality by enhancing cooperation 
between farmers.  Since our field experiment involves nitrate-N pollution impacting a 
watershed level payment distributed to farmers, under a team approach Farmer C has an 
incentive to encourage Farmers B and D to determine if the litter applied contains 
nutrients in excess of crop needs.  If excess nitrate is being land applied, this could reduce 
the watershed level payment to all participating farmers.  Thus, under excess land   7
application, these three farmers may be better off transferring a portion of Farmer A's 
litter elsewhere rather than only transferring it to Farmers B and D.  In our field 
experiment, Cullers Run farmers are presented with such an incentive to work within a 
team approach to investigate issues related to land application of litter.         
Calculating Prices and Payments 
Numerous authors have discussed the challenges posed by ANP (Cabe and 
Herriges; Smith and Tomasi; Shortle et al.; and Ribaudo et al.).  The premise underlying 
our research is that if farmers are paid as a group based on water quantity and ambient 
water quality measured at the watershed level, then they will respond in a way that cost-
effectively reduces ANP.  To examine our premise in the field, we need a payment 
schedule that indicates to farmers how much they can expect to earn. However, 
developing such a payment schedule is difficult when prices for water are absent and data 
on water quality and stream flow are lacking.   
In general, payments need to satisfy four conditions: 1) motivate farmers to 
participate in the experiment, 2) provide sufficient incentive to pursue ANP abatement, 3) 
sensibly reflect environmental conditions, and 4) be seen as fair and likely to enhance the 
well-being of participants.  Varian describes conditions 1) and 2) as incentive compatible 
conditions within principle-agent case.  Condition 3) means that payments need to make 
allowances for natural fluctuations beyond the control of farmers.  For condition 4), we 
assume that issues of fairness and equity enter into the mental calculus of farmers 
(Breetz, Fisher-Vanden, et al.).  Thus, we think that payments need to sensibly reflect 
both environmental conditions and local sensibilities.    
Given these conditions, we developed a payment formula:     8
 
(1)  () ()
price
Watershed Payment volume of water quality adjustment factor
unit volume 
⎛⎞ =× × ⎜⎟
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Equation (1) has intuitive appeal.  Like a traditional agricultural commodity, the greater 
volume of water that farmers “produce”, the more they get paid as water volume flowing 
from a watershed is multiplied by a per unit price for water.  Also, as explained below, 
the quality adjustment factor makes payments an increasing function of improving water 
quality.  However, for farmers to evaluate the feasibility of participating and pursuing 
ANP abatement, they need to know how large the payments are likely to be prior to the 
experiment, and how sensitive the payments are to ANP abatement.  Thus, we need to 
simulate payments by estimating each of the three components of equation (1).   
Estimating Discharge  
With no existing flow gauge, we needed to estimate the acre-feet of water per 
month “produced” by Cullers Run watershed.  Using 32 months of mean monthly flow 
data from the US Geological Survey (USGS) for a nearby watershed of comparable size, 
and monthly rainfall data from Cacapon Institute (unpublished data), we generated “best 
fit” non-linear equations with  Microsoft Excel 2003 that relate this watershed flow data 
to rainfall.  Two seasonal equations (growing and non-growing) provided estimates of 
watershed level flow based on rainfall
22 (R  0.42, and R  0.48 respectively). ==   Thus, 
given rainfall, we can roughly estimate Cullers Run discharge.   
Solving for a Water Price   
Water prices were estimated based on the opportunity cost incurred by farmers 
from using land to produce water quality improvements rather than agricultural   9
production.  To derive this opportunity cost, we assumed that 10% of the agricultural land 
in the watershed could be set aside as grass riparian buffers to produce water quality 
improvements.  Implementation of these buffers was assumed to reduce pollution loading 
of nitrate-N by 75% based on expected reductions to sediment and bacteria (Palace et al.).  
The loss of agricultural income was approximated with crop net revenue from the USDA 
census of corn and hay production costs and returns for the Eastern Uplands between 
1996 and 2004 (USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service), standardized using the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics consumer price index (US Bureau of Labor Statistics).  
Estimates for pasture revenue are based on the average pasture rental values as presented 
by Whittle and Stanley.   
Using this information, we set up an optimization program using the CONOPT 
nonlinear programming solver within GAMS Integrated Development Environment 
(GAMS) software.  Our objective function assumed net revenue maximizing farmers who 
were subject to constraints on acreage, their ability to shift land between pasture and 
cropland, and non-negativity from water revenue.  Intuitively, our model selects 
agricultural production until payments for water quality are sufficiently high to induce 
conservation.  We ran separate GAMS models for each season and at different rainfall 
levels to compute water prices under different conditions.  Minimum prices were 
determined that could be offered per acre-foot of water to induce Cullers Run farmers to 
undertake water quality conservation.  
The prices generated from the optimization model are shown in Table 1. They 
make intuitive sense from both economic value and pollutant loading perspectives. 
During the growing season (May-September), the discharge is lower due to low rainfall,   10
and loading of pollutants is decreased.  Thus, higher per unit water prices are needed to 
induce BMP implementation. Conversely, high discharges and non-growing season leads 
to lower prices, as marginal water values are low and pollutant loads are higher. By using 
different prices, payment risk to both landowners and the regulator is reduced. A 
sensitivity analysis of the optimization program projected only small changes in 
payments between rainfall regimes (Maille and Collins). 
Table 1 ABOUT HERE 
Incorporating Water Quality   
Based on water quality data from the study area for bacteria, turbidity, various 
forms of phosphorus, and nitrate-N (Cacapon Institute) we selected nitrate-N as an 
indicator of water quality changes.  Monitoring data from the Cacapon Institute showed 
that nitrate-N concentration in streams, and therefore load, varied more predictably with 
rainfall than other pollutants and was positively related to the extent of agricultural land 
in a watershed.  Nitrate-N does, however, entail some disadvantages.  Unlike turbidity, 
nitrate-N resides in subsurface water, thus potentially producing a time lag between 
generation and contribution to ambient stream concentrations.  Finally, it is present 
naturally which can introduce “noise” to the incentive scheme.   
Recalling that the payment schedule needs to be sensible and fair, payment levels 
should account for the background fraction of nitrate-N contamination that farmers do not 
control.  To account for background nitrate-N, an “index watershed” approach was used:  
 
(2)  Quality 
Index Watershed nitrate-N
Adjustment Factor =   
Experimental Watershed nitrate-N
 
   11
Waites Run watershed was utilized as the index watershed in equation (1).  It is 
96% forested with very little agricultural land, located in the same county as the 
experimental watershed, and is approximately the same size.  Thus, it serves as a 
weather-sensitive baseline measure of nitrate-N loads.   
In order to utilize equation (2) to estimate prices, we needed estimates of nitrate-N 
loading in the watershed as a function of land use.  For the current pasture and forest 
nitrate-N contributions, we generated a system of three simultaneous equations with 
pollutant contribution for forest and pasture as the independent variable using watershed-
level data from Cacapon Institute.  We estimated the pollutant contribution from cropland 
based on Randall and Vetsch.   
Since water quality monitoring data show that nitrate-N concentration increases 
during periods of high rainfall (Cacapon Institute), we related our rainfall data to Cullers 
Run nitrate-N concentrations with Excel 2003 providing the best fit non-linear equations 
for non-growing season and growing seasons 
22 (R  0.53, and R  0.48 respectively). ==   
We formed a ratio of estimated nitrate-N during periods of low, average or high rainfall, 
over the expected nitrate-N concentrations during average rainfall and used this ratio as a 
simple multiplier.  Our low, average, and high rainfall levels correspond with the monthly 
rainfall totals for each season exceeded by 25%, 50%, and 75% of the months 
respectively.  Thus, our estimate of Cullers Run nitrate is shown in equation (3) as the 
sum of current nitrate contributions for each land-use, increased or decreased slightly by 
a rainfall multiplier.    






0.3188 ave. monthly rainfall
Lbs. nitrate-N
(acres landuse )
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The resulting nitrate-N estimated loads from equation (3) make up the denominator for 
the operational version of the adjustment factor shown by equation (4) based on the non-
growing season rainfall multiplier.  The numerator in the adjustment factor is the average 
Waites Run nitrate-N load.   
 
(4)  Adj. Factor = 
0.3188 rainfall level
0.3188 ave. monthly rainfall
Average nitrate-N load Waites Run
Lbs. nitrate-N
(acres landuse )  










Payment simulations    
Farmers need estimates of likely payments, not just prices, before deciding to 
participate.  With this in mind, we used estimated monthly water quantities (discharge) 
based on rainfall, prices from Table 1, and a ratio of nitrate-N concentrations as the 
adjustment factor, within equation (1) to simulate four years of monthly watershed 
payments.  Data were from regional rainfall and nitrate-N concentrations in Cullers and 
Waites Run from 1999 to 2002 (Cacapon Institute, unpublished data). 
These simulated payments are represented by data points in Figure 3.  The trend 
lines “Table 1 Prices” show the relationship between estimated payment and discharge at 
low, medium and high discharge levels using Table 1 summer prices.  The “One Price” 
trend lines show the price-discharge relationship that would exist at these three discharge   13
levels if price was held constant at $8 / ac-ft.  We observe that, on average, payments are 
boosted at low discharge and decreased at high discharge by using prices that are 
sensitive to discharge.  We also note that payments are still an increasing function of 
discharge.  Thus, the schedule of prices in Table 1 appears to maintain the desired 
incentive, while diminishing the risk of overly low or overly high payments caused by 
variation in rainfall.   
Figure 3 ABOUT HERE 
Figure 3B shows how increasing abatement affects the payments.  Looking at the 
payment for a single month (hollow triangle just above $500 at a discharge of 950 ac-ft 
from Panel A) and maintaining the original price, payments increase at an increasing rate 
as nitrate-N decreases.  Assuming that total and marginal abatement costs are convex, we 
think that the shape of the payment function shown in Panel B is appropriate.  
When simulated payments were totaled on an annual basis, these payments 
averaged $7,721 with a range of $4,593 to $9,400. We also estimated payments based on 
a 25% reduction in nitrate-N. At this level of abatement, payments were $9,595 annually, 
ranging between $5,898 and $11,480. The difference between the payments with and 
without additional abatement represents an opportunity cost to watershed farmers of not 
abating nitrate-N.  
Lastly, the extent to which the adjustment factor reduces the influence of natural 
variation of nitrate-N on payments was assessed.  Nitrate-N concentration was regressed 
on estimated monthly discharge for Cullers Run over 48 months of data (Cacapon 
Institute, unpublished data).  We found that the two are significantly related (R
2 = 0.25, 
p<0.001).  However, when the adjustment factor (measured as the ratio of Waites Run   14
nitrate-N concentration over Cullers Run nitrate-N concentration) was regressed on 
monthly discharge this relationship was statistically insignificant (R
2 = 0.03, p<0.23).  
Including a seasonal dummy variable to account for effects of growing season had very 
little impact on this result.  Our conclusion is that the adjustment factor effectively 
eliminated the influence of fluctuating background nitrate-N on payment levels.
1 
Comparing Estimated with Actual Measurements   
Figure 4 compares estimated values for discharge, adjustment factors, and 
simulated payments with the actual measurements from the first year of our field 
experiment beginning April 1st.  Data are presented by quarter for simplicity.  We note 
that over the first quarter and the last quarter, the simulated payments and adjustment 
factors were closer to the actual values than those for quarters 2 and 3.  We attribute some 
of this divergence between actual and estimated values to be the result of dry conditions 
that prevailed during this period.  Abnormally dry conditions were documented in the 
area that includes Cullers Run from July of 2007 through October of 2007 (USDA, DOC, 
NOAA).  
Figure 4 ABOUT HERE 
Given the limited data and abnormal weather, it is difficult to draw conclusions 
from Figure 4.  Looking at the comparison in general, the modeling that produced the 
estimates seems to have performed better when rainfall was approximately average.  
When pushed by dry conditions, the adjustment factor values increased dramatically.  In 
fact, two months had adjustment factors greater than one.  For this to be true, nitrate-N in 
Cullers Run would have to be less than natural background nitrate levels.  The most 
                                                 
1 Using twelve months of direct measurements of flow, Cullers Run nitrate-N, and Waites Run nitrate-N 
from the first year of the experiment resulted in the same conclusion..       15
plausible explanation for the high adjustment factor values, is that flow in Waites Run 
was higher than anticipated, thus delivering greater loads of nitrate-N.  This could result 
from more productive springs in Waites Run that are able to maintain a greater flow in 
the face of dry conditions.  Alternatively, summer rainfall includes localized 
thunderstorms.  It is possible that there was a significant rainfall differential between 
Waites Run and Cullers Run.     
Overall, total payments during the first year were $5,630, about 27% less than the 
simulated average, but within the range of simulated payments ($4,593 to $9,400).  The 
discharge was 64% below the average estimated based on the four years of data, while 
the adjustment factor was nearly triple the estimate, averaging 0.369 per month instead of 
0.133. 
Communicating with Potential Participants 
In December 2006, we began to advertise and inform local farmers about this 
field experiment project.  These efforts included:  a presentation at the Mathias Ruritan 
Club (many of the watershed residents are members of this community service 
organization), articles in community newspaper about the project, and a letter sent to all 
agricultural landowners (based on agricultural land use tax exemptions) in the Cullers 
Run watershed inviting them to an introductory meeting.   
During the winter of 2007, four meetings were organized by project researchers.  
Local community resources were used for a meeting place and to provide meals at each 
meeting.  Aerial photo maps of Cullers Run watershed were prepared by the Natural 
Resource Analysis Center at West Virginia University.  These maps were displayed and   16
copies were given out to all attendees.  These maps proved to be very popular among 
attendees.   
Each of these meetings was attended by twenty to thirty people.  Overall, a 
substantial portion of farmer households in the watershed attended at least one meeting.  
We also made efforts to involve community elites in the project.  The county extension 
agent attended a meeting, and a county commissioner was recruited to lead one of the 
meetings.  State and federal government conservation agency personnel attended 
meetings and assisted with presentations.    
During these meetings, the project was described as a unique field experiment 
involving economic incentives to abate ANP.  We expected that these incentives would 
take the form of monthly payments over a period of two years, based on the quantity and 
quality of water flowing from the watershed, to farmers who chose to participate.  The 
introductory meeting included a presentation about water quality as an issue in Cullers 
Run and the Lost River watershed in general.     
There were two important outcomes from these meetings: (1) a written agreement 
was created with the input of farmers; and (2) a farmer advisory committee was 
established to determine how to allocate the watershed payments among participants.  
The agreement was discussed and revised a number of times during the meetings. It 
served to clarify the institutional framework of the experiment and outlined the roles and 
responsibilities of both farmers and researchers.  Comments and suggestions about this 
agreement were obtained from a lawyer on the Agricultural and Resource Economics 
faculty at West Virginia University.   Key stipulations for farmers in this agreement 
included:   17
• Participation in this project is voluntary and is initiated by signing an agreement.  
• A participant who has signed an agreement can choose to leave the project at any 
time with no penalty or further obligation.  
• Payments will be made monthly to ‘The Group’. The initial participants will 
determine how these monthly payments are allocated among the participants. The 
resulting allocation rules will be presented to researchers, who will use these rules 
to distribute the monthly payments and be responsible for disbursements.  
• Participants are allowed to be enrolled in state or federal cost-share programs.  
• A participant is able to select which best management practice (BMP) or other 
management change to implement in order to impact water quality. 
• Signing an agreement does not obligate a participant to implement any BMP.  
Farmers, along with researchers, have difficulty projecting the amount and timing 
of pollution reductions resulting from BMP implementation (Park et al.; Bracmort et al.).  
Thus, risk reduction aspects of this agreement include the voluntary aspects of 
participation, BMP selection, and BMP implementation.  Participants can mitigate risk by 
allocating more of the monthly payments to those farmers that implement BMPs.     
Creation of an advisory committee emerged as a suggestion by farmer attendees 
during the meeting that was led by a county commissioner.  The purpose of this meeting 
was to assist farmers in determining how they would organize themselves as a group in 
this project.  This advisory committee consisted of five farmers from the watershed, each 
who had attended most of the meetings.  The committee met only once.  At this meeting, 
they developed recommendations regarding payment allocation that were subsequently   18
presented at a follow-up meeting just prior to the beginning of project sign-up.   These 
recommendations were formally approved at the first meeting of project participants.  
Observed Farmer Participation 
Farmers were able to sign a written agreement to participate in the project 
beginning April 1, 2007. To date, fifteen farm households have signed an agreement. 
This sign-up represented about one-half of the farmers who attended the series of 
meetings introducing the project to farmers.  Using farmer reported agricultural use 
information as well as aerial photo data, we computed that participating farm households 
own or operate approximately 41% of the agricultural land in the watershed. 
Participation was found to be unevenly distributed throughout the watershed. 
Cullers Run watershed can be divided into two main sections. The lower section is where 
most of the row cropping takes place. In this section, only about 10% of agricultural land 
is farmed by a project participant. In the upper section, hay fields and pasture 
predominate.  Participating farmers operate 49% of the agricultural land in this section.  
Based on participating hectares, a simple Chi-squared test of independence indicated that 
the likelihood of a given hectare of land being included in the project is not independent 
of location (p<0.01).
2 Our interpretation is that farmland in the lower section is 
significantly less likely to be enrolled in the project than farmland in the upper section.  
Maille and Collins (forthcoming) surmise that the lower participation rate for farmers in 
                                                 
2 Use of this test assumes that each hectare is a separate management unit, which is not the case. 
Rather, land ownership is grouped by tracts ranging from 15 to more than 320 hectares in size.  
We also conducted a test for independence between farm location and participation based on all 
farmers who attended a preliminary meeting. This test was significant (p=0.05) indicating that 
participation and farm location were not independent.  
   19
this section is the result of the greater risk to agricultural production that these farmers 
face when participating in the project because fertilizer use is greater in this section. 
As a group, participating farmers have made two important decisions: (1) 
allocation of watershed payments; and (2) a request for a watershed-wide sampling to 
verify source areas of nitrate-N. As suggested by the advisory committee, their payment 
allocation involved: (a) a $50 signing bonus to each participant who signed up prior to 
June 1
st, 2007, (b) 10% of each monthly payment is to be distributed equally among all 
participants, (c) the remaining 90% is reserved to financially assist farmers who engage 
in N-nitrate abatement, and (d) any remaining funds at the end of the year are to be paid 
out as a bonus to all participants. This allocation provides early participants with 
immediate rewards, and addresses issues of risk from BMP implementation by individual 
farmers. 
A watershed-wide nitrate-N sampling was conducted in April 2007.  The results 
were presented to farmers at a June 2007 meeting. These results agreed with prior water 
quality data that showed the majority of nitrate-N originated from the lower section of the 
watershed.  A second watershed-wide sampling in January 2008 produced similar results 
showing that the lower section of the watershed generated the greatest nitrate-N loading 
in both absolute and per unit area amounts.    
As for nitrate-N abatement , the detailed sampling run in April showed three 
locations where nitrate-N contributions were highest on a per-square mile basis., The 
farmer responsible for one of these has, with the support of federal cost-share assistance, 
built a feeding and manure shed for his cattle.  Another of these areas is the lower section 
of the watershed.  This section is farmed by multiple households, only one of which is   20
currently participating.   This complicates abatement strategies in this area.  Currently, 
participating farmers are recruiting more lower section farmers into the project. 
In March 2008, the group developed a simple procedure to assess how to utilize 
the accumulated watershed payments for ANP abatement cost-sharing.  To date, one 
proposal has been put forth:  one participant has requested cost-sharing for a winter cover 
crop.  Another participant has discussed construction of streamside fencing and improved 
livestock watering facilities.     
Conclusions 
Looking at both the estimated prices and payment simulations, we are encouraged 
by the results of the field experiment to date.  The payment formula seems to have 
conveyed an appropriate incentive as a significant portion of farm households in the 
watershed are participating, and there has been some nitrate-N abatement.  Payments for 
water quantity and quality are being made to farmers based on a payment allocation 
scheme that they developed and have twice revised slightly.  
Despite the simplified nature of our watershed modeling, actual payments have 
been reasonably close those simulated prior to the experiment.  However, we need to 
better understand the reasons behind the divergence between the expected and actual 
values for the adjustment factors presented in Figure 4.  We expect continued water 
quality and flow data will help us in this respect.   
To facilitate information sharing between researchers and farmers, we have 
established a project website (http://www.cacaponinstitute.org/wvunri.htm).  Also, 
anticipating that the initial two year time frame of the experiment may limit farmer 
interest in ANP abatement, a third year for the experiment was committed to by the   21
researchers during the first year.  This third year was made possible when lower than 
expected first year payments resulted in extra project funds being available. 
With respect to participation, an important challenge has been encountered.  
Water quality data indicate that the area contributing the most nitrate-N is the lower 
section which is farmed by multiple households.  Participation and/or cooperation of 
farmers in this area are crucial to achieving meaningful nitrate-N abatement in this 
experiment.  Given their low participation rate, a practical research question involves 
how to bring farmers in the lower section into the field experiment.  Participants have 
approached farmers in this section about participating, but so far there have been no 
additional sign-ups.     
Given the characteristics of this section, we can also investigate the role that 
information on soil nutrients may play in determining farmer response. For example, 
Feather and Amacher find that information can increase farmer willingness to adopt 
BMPs. A potentially relevant example is presented by Fuglie and Bosch. They 
determined that corn farmers decreased fertilization rates when provided with 
information from soil tests indicating that they could fertilize less without introducing 
additional production risk.   
With this possibility in mind we invited a Nutrient Management Specialist from 
Cooperative Extension to a meeting during 2007.  He discussed some of the alternatives 
open to the farmers for more tightly managing soil nitrogen including stalk nitrogen tests 
to determine post-side dressing nitrogen needs.  Farmers have not responded to these 
possibilities yet, although, they have requested the materials needed for soil testing.     
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Table 1.  Computed seasonal water prices. 









Up to 320  18  Up to 740  8 
321-800 8 
Over 800  5 
Over 740  5 
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